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CASENOTES 
TORTS-FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT-
EXCEPTION AS TO ASSAULT AND BATTERY 
567 
Plaintiff's decedent, the first mate, returned to his ship ac-
companied by the chief steward, second mate and two other 
friends who were civilian employees of the United States. The 
sentry, pursuant to orders, refused to allow the civilians aboard 
the ship and asked them to leave. An argument ensued where-
upon the sentry drew his pistol and fired one shot wildly. Both 
the deceased and the chief steward iunged for the sentry in an 
effort to disarm him and in the ensuing struggle for the pistol 
the deceased was shot. Plaintiff, wife of the deceased, brought 
suit against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act. 
Held: the court rejected the government's contention that this in-
jury came within the assault and battery exception of the Federal 
Tort Claims Act and awarded the plaintiff $68,000 damages.1 
The federal government has waived its general immunity 
from tort claims through passage of the Federal Tort Claims Act. 
The act provides that the United States shall be liable in the same 
manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like 
circumstances.2 This waiver does not extend to certain situations 
which are expressly set forth as exceptions in the act.3 The scope 
of this note will be limited to the assault and battery exception 
contained in Section 2680. This section provides: 
The provisions of this chapter and Section 1346 (b) of this title 
shall not apply to ... (h) Any claim arising out of assault, bat-
tery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, 
abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit or in-
terference with contract rights. 
i Tastor v. United States. 124 F. Supp. 548 (S.D. Cal. 1954). 
2 62 Stat. 933 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1952). 
3 60 Stat. 845 (1946), 28 U.S.C. § 2680(b) (1952). 
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The plaintiff's recovery in the instant case depended upon 
whether her claim was one "arising out of assault, battery ... " 
within the meaning of Section 2680 (h). Legislative history re-
peatedly refers to this section as the exception dealing with "deli-
berate torts such as assault and battery."4 Specific testimony at 
the committee hearings indicated that the language of Section 
2680 (h) did not encompass "negligent assaults" but included only 
those torts of a deliberate nature.5 The instant case seems con-
sistent with these expressions of congressional intent in that the 
sentry's handling of his pistol was probably mere negligence and 
certainly no more than a "negligent assault."6 
The instant case is the most recent in a series wherein the 
plaintiff or plaintiff's decedent was injured by a sentry or guard. 
These cases may be readily classified according to the sentry's 
conduct. 
At opposite poles are cases in which the injured party was 
denied recovery. Stepp v. United States7 illustrates one extreme. 
A sentry shot and wounded X who was fleeing arrest. It was held 
that the sentry's conduct constituted a deliberate tort within Sec-
tion 2680 (h) ; hence the government was immune from liability. 
At the other extreme are cases like Folk v. United States.8 
As a sentry pursued X, who was fleeing arrest, the sentry's gun 
discharged accidentally killing X. The court held that the sentry 
was exercising due care in his pursuit and no negligence was 
proved, so the government was not held liable. 
Between these two extremes are situations like Cerri v. United 
States/.1 A sentry shot at X who was fleeing arrest, but the 
bullet missed X and injured Y. It was held that the sentry's 
4 Sen. Rep. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1946); H.R. Rep. No. 
1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1945). 
G Hearing before Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 
6463, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1942). 
6 When a defendant has exhibited wanton negligence or exceedingly 
reckless conduct, the resulting injury is sometimes termed a negligent as-
sault; intent is supplied through the concept of implied intent (one is 
presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his acts). 
For example, if A shoots into a crowd of people he is said to have in-
tended the resulting harm. However. most authorities reject the concept 
of negligent assault either expressly or by ignoring it. See Restatement, 
Torts §§ 20, 21 (1934); Prosser, Torts 47 (1941). 
7 207 F.2d 909 (4th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 933 (1954); 
Lewis v. United States, 194 F.2d 689 (3d Cir. 1952). 
8199 F.2d 889 (4th Cir. 1952). 
!l 80 F. Supp. 831 (N.D. Cal. 1948). 
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conduct was negligent but did not constitute an assault or bat-
tery ;10 hence the government was liable. 
Apparently the instant case fits into the latter of the above 
categories. Viewed in its worst light11 the sentry's conduct merely 
constituted a "negligent assault," which legislative history clearly 
indicates is not within the exceptions of Section 2€i80(h). Such 
a conclusion is buttressed by Supreme Court opinions indicating 
that the Federal Tort Claims Act must be liberally construed.12 
If the statute as a whole is to be liberally construed, the excep-
tions section which limits the application of the statute must be 
strictly construed. Of course a strict construction13 of the ex-
ceptions section would include only truly deliberate torts and ex-
clude grossly negligent or reckless conduct amounting to a "neg-
ligent assault." 
Aside from the problem of applying the exceptions section to 
particular fact situations, this section by its very presence poses 
an interesting problem. The main policy basis for the act is in 
general twofold: (1) to reduce the multitude of private bills 
thrown upon the Congress, and, more important, (2) to provide 
10 The court ruled that an assault or battery based on the doctrine of 
transferred intent was not an assault or battery within the meaning of 
Section 2 6 8 0 (h), thereby adopting a strict construction of that section. 
As to transferred intent generally, see Restatement, Torts § 21 (1934); 
Prosser, Torts 47 (1941). 
11 Note 6 supra. indicates that the concept of "negligent assault" is 
not widely recognized. At any rate the facts of the instant case reveal 
nothing more than an ordinary case of negligence and would not con-
stitute a "negligent assault" even in those jurisdictions where the con-
cept is recognized. 
12 United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543, 554 (1951); "We 
think that the Congressional attitude in passing the Tort Claims Act is 
more accurately reflected in Judge Cardozo's statement in Anderson v. 
Hayes Const. Co., 243 N.Y. 140, 147, 153 N.E. 28, 29-30: 'The exemption 
of the sovereign from suit involves hardship enough where consent has 
been withheld. We are not to add to its rigor by refinement of construc-
tion where consent has been announced.' " Aetna Casualty Co. v. United 
States, 338 U.S. 366, 383 (1..949). 
13 Despite the opinions of the Supreme Court. some lower courts con-
tinue to construe the exceptions section liberally. Moos v. United States, 
118 F. Supp. 275 (D. Minn. 1954); Wilcox v. United States, 117 F. Supp. 
119 (S.D. N.Y. 1953); Duenges v. United States, 114 F. Supp. 751 (S.D. 
N.Y. 1953). In the Wilcox case the plaintiff, while an inmate at a United 
States hospital was stabbed by another inmate. Plaintiff alleged that 
the proximate cause of his injury was the failure of the government to 
provide proper supervision through the use of sufficient guards and at-
tendants. Nevertheless, the court held that plaintiff's claim was one 
arising out of an assault and battery. 
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adequate relief for those injured by negligent acts of government 
employees.14 In many situations an individual's opportunity to 
obtain relief through the passage of a private bill depended more 
upon his eligibility for a political favor than upon the merits of 
his particular claim. Once a bill was introduced it was sometimes 
subjected to the further uncertainties of legislative "log-rolling." 
In addition Congress was greatly handicapped in its consideration 
of tort claims because it did not possess the machinery of the 
judiciary for hearing and deciding a particular case or contro-
versy.11J Opponents of the Federal Tort Claims Act, of course, 
raised the classic argument that an injured party has a remedy 
against the individual who caused the harm and hence needs no 
remedy against the government. The fact that the individual is 
often judgment-proof presents a ready answer to this argument. 
Valid reasons for the exception for deliberate torts are dif-
ficult to ascertain. The following have been suggested as reasons: 
(1) such suits are difficult to defend;16 (2) there is a likelihood 
of judgments out of proportion to actual damage because of the 
inflamatory nature of such claims and the possibilities for ex-
aggeration ;17 (3) the F.B.I. and other federal law enforcement 
agencies might subject the government to liability through third 
degree tactics in the questioning of suspects ;18 ( 4) the exception 
is in harmony with Section 267419 which disallows punitive dam-
ages under the act ;20 and ( 5) most of the claims against the 
government relate to traumatic injuries from public vehicles and 
private property damage, claims for negligence and not deliberate 
torts.21 
H Shumate, Tort Claims Against State Government, 9 Law & Contemp. 
Prob. 242, 249 (1942). 
u; This is true despite the fact that in more recent years the congres-
sional investigating committee has assumed many of the powers and pro-
cedures of a court. In addition. the time element is important. Although 
by no means conclusive, it is enlightening to consider the time devoted 
to tort claims in the legislatures of the states. In the State of Nebraska, 
for example, the legislature spent an average of 21 and 18 minutes in 
1939 and 1940 respectively considering private claim bills. See Shumate, 
op. cit. supra note 14, at 250. It cannot seriously be contended that a 
plaintiff's claim can properly be heard in such a short period of time. 
10 Hearings before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on S. 2690, 
76th Cong., 3d Sess. 39 (1940). 
17 Ibid. 
rn Comment, 56 Yale L.J. 534, 547 (1947). 
lfl 62 Stat. 938 (1948); 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1952). 
20 Gottlieb. The Federal Tort Claims Act-A Statutory Interpretation, 
35 Geo. L.J. 1, 49 (1946). 
21 Id. at 50. 
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Since the tort claims under the act are to be tried before a 
judge without a jury,22 the objections as to difficulty of defense 
and possible exaggerations bear little weight. If the conduct of 
the F.B.I. supports a claim for injuries arising out of an assault 
and battery, it seems entirely proper that relief should be granted. 
As to punitive damages, Section 2674 specifically excludes them. 
And of course normal damages should be paid even though oc-
casioned by conduct which would incidentally support punitive 
damages in the usual civil suit.23 Finally, the fact that there are 
not a great number of cases involving deliberate torts is hardly a 
valid reason for denying relief in those cases where intentional 
injury has been inflicted. 
It is indeed anamolous that a person should be allowed re-
covery when the defendant's agent is merely negligent and yet 
denied recovery when the defendant's agent, within the scope of 
employment, deliberately injures him. The overriding policy of 
providing the injured party some remuneration dictates that the 
exception for deliberate torts be limited by strict judicial inter-
pretation, or, perhaps, entirely eliminated through legislative a-
mendment. 
Alfred Blessing, '55 
22 62 Stat. 971. 28 U.S.C. § 2402 (1952). 
23 Such liability is contemplated by the express terms of section 2674. 
:Most deliberate torts, such as false imprisonment, cause little actual dam-
age and the bulk of awards is based primarily upon the theory of punitive 
damages. In many situations it would be difficult to separate punitive from 
actual damages, and in others some courts might unconsciously award 
greater damages for harm resulting from deliberate conduct than for like 
harm resulting for mere negligence. Nevertheless, enlightened judicial 
administration should solve these problems inherent in the exclusion of 
punitive damages and yet allow adequate redress for actual damages. 
